Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment by Spitzer, Robert J.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 76 




Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment 
Robert J. Spitzer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 349 (2000). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol76/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 




A large and increasingly influential body of writing argues for a
new and very different interpretation of the Second Amendment-
different, that is, from the verdict delivered by the Constitution's
founders, history, and the courts. This emerging discourse, which I
will refer to generally as the individualist view, shares three key traits.
First, this new theory of the Second Amendment has emerged and
proliferated almost entirely from lawyers writing in law journals.
Second, this emergent body of writing is exerting progressively more
influence over Second Amendment interpretation, writings in the
public press, and perhaps public policy. Third, this new theory of the
Second Amendment is stunningly and fatally defective.
In other writing, I discuss in considerable detail the substance of
the arguments concerning the basis for, and meaning of, the Second
Amendment.' I will therefore raise them much more briefly here.
The primary purpose of this Article is not to retread the usual
arguments, but rather to examine the provenance of Second
Amendment writings in law journals, compare this provenance with
claims made about it, and to discuss the unique traits of this
literature's development. By focusing almost entirely on law journal
writing, I will also advance an argument that may incur some ire from
my colleagues in the legal community. Specifically, I argue that law
journals provide a uniquely fertile breeding ground for the
development of defective constitutional analysis, a phenomenon by
no means unique to the realm of the Second Amendment. In another
publication dealing with a different area of constitutional law, I offer
* Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, State University of New York,
College at Cortland. My thanks to Carl Bogus, Michael Dorf, Jerry O'Callaghan, and Bryan
Sugar.
1. See ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL (1998).
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the same argument.2 To be sure, abundant and excellent scholarship
appears in legal publications, and I do not mean to minimize these
numerous important contributions. Nevertheless, the body of
analysis that is the focus of this Article is, I believe, uniquely and
inextricably linked to the size, nature, and functioning of law journals.
This Article proceeds, first, with a brief explication of the
meaning of the Second Amendment. It then examines the manner in
which the debate over this Amendment has been depicted in recent
news accounts and proceeds to the two chief emergent critiques of
Second Amendment analysis: the individualist view and the so-called
right of revolution. Following that, four collateral claims arising from
and connected with the individualist and revolutionist perspectives
are examined in light of an assessment of the provenance of Second
Amendment writings in law journals, as is the reputed role of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, three explanations are offered for
the emergence of this new body of writing on the Second
Amendment.
I. THE MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Few parts of the Constitution are so often invoked, yet so
misunderstood, as the Second Amendment. Polemic aside, the
meaning of the Second Amendment is relatively clear. As the text
itself says, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed."3  Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger
wrote that the Second Amendment "must be read as though the word
'because' was the opening word,' 4 as in "[because a] well-regulated
Militia [is] necessary to the security of a free State. . ." As debate
2. I have previously examined another instance where law journals have provided the
breeding ground for an extensive and, briefly, influential, body of literature that argued that
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provided the president with an item veto (referred to as
an inherent item veto). This startling proposition, which otherwise would have been met with
dismissive scorn by presidential scholars, spawned and flourished in the fertile turf of law
journals, reaching its apex in 1989 when President George Bush announced that he planned to
exercise an item veto based on this very theory (Bush repudiated this theory in 1992). That a
sitting president would contemplate such a move attests to the sway of law reviews, as well as to
the extent to which these publications might serve as a breeding ground for wayward
constitutional theories. The analysis of the Second Amendment in this Article will make a
similar argument. See Robert J. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of the Presidential Line-Item Veto,
112 POL. SC. 0. 261 (1997).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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concerning the Second Amendment preceding and during the First
Congress made clear, the Second Amendment was added to allay the
concerns of Antifederalists and others who feared that state
sovereignty, and more specifically the ability of states to meet military
emergencies on their own, would be impinged or neglected by the
new federal government, which had been given vast new powers,
particularly and alarmingly over the use of military force.6 In other
words, the inclusion of the Second Amendment embodied the
Federalist assurance that the state militias would be allowed to
continue as a viable military and political supplement to the national
army at a time when military tensions within and between the states
ran high, suspicions of a national standing army ran even higher, and
military takeovers were the norm in world affairs.' Debate
concerning what became the Second Amendment during the First
Congress dealt entirely with several narrow military questions: the
need to maintain civilian government control over the military, the
military unreliability of militias as compared with professional armies,
possible threats to liberties from armies versus militias, and whether
to codify the right of conscientious objectors to opt out of military
service.
8
As four Supreme Court cases and nearly twenty lower federal
court rulings have made clear, the Second Amendment pertains only
to citizen service in a government-organized and regulated militia
(remembering that militiamen were expected to bring their own
firearms), the regulation of which specifically appertains to Congress
in Article I, Section 8.9 The abysmal performance of civilian militiaslo
in the War of 1812 essentially ended the government's use of such
forces to meet military emergencies. Millett and Maslowski noted
that "[a]fter the War of 1812 military planners realized that no matter
how often politicians glorified citizen-soldiers.., reliance on the
common militia to reinforce the regular Army was chimerical."" As
6. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 24, 25, 28, 29,46 (Alexander Hamilton).
7. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 182-84, 198-99 (1991); GARRY WILLS, A
NECESSARY EVIL 119-21 (1999).
8. Id.
9. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252
(1886); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). The
Court acknowledged this line of cases in Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 90 (1980). A list of the
pertinent federal court rulings appears infra note 111. See SPITZER, supra note 1, at 17-42, for a
fuller discussion of these cases.
10. Also referred to as unorganized or general.
11. ALLAN R. MILLEITr & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A
MILITARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 129 (1984). The authors quote Representative
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Ehrman and Henigan observed, the "history of the state militias
between 1800 and the 1870s is one of total abandonment,
disorganization, and degeneration. 12 Instead, the government came
to rely on professional military forces that were expanded in times of
emergency by the military draft. The select or volunteer militias used
in the Civil War, which date to colonial times, were institutionalized
and brought under federal military authority as the National Guard
early in the twentieth century. 3  Further, even if the Second
Amendment did pertain to personal weapon ownership or use outside
of militia service, the Court has refused to incorporate it via the
Fourteenth Amendment,14 unlike most of the rest of the Bill of
Rights, thereby limiting its relevance only to federal action. In any
case, the Second Amendment provides no protection for personal
weapons use, including hunting, sporting, collecting, or even personal
self-protection.
Despite the definitive nature of constitutional reading, historical
lessons, and court rulings, some legal writers, publishing primarily in
law journals, have sought to spin out other interpretations of the
Second Amendment.'5 These authors have succeeded in finding
legitimacy for a variety of erroneous and even nonsensical arguments
concerning the meaning of the Second Amendment through
publication in law journals. Arguments advanced in these
publications have, in turn, seeped into the public press. When this
happens, it may easily magnify what might otherwise be a minor
distortion. To take one example, an article in the Wall Street Journal
reported in late 1999 that one of the key factors leading to new
Jabez Upham, who observed in 1808 during debate in the House of Representatives that
reliance on citizen militias
will do very well on paper; it sounds well in the war speeches on this floor. To talk
about every soldier being a citizen, and every citizen being a soldier, and to declaim
that the militia of our country is the bulwark of our liberty is very captivating. All this
will figure to advantage in history. But it will not do at all in practice.
Id.
12. Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth
Centurty: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 5, 36 (1989); see also
JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 317 (1988); WILLIAM RIKER, SOLDIERS OF
THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 21-40 (1957).
13. See 39 Stat. 166 (1916); MILLETT & MASLOWSKI, supra note 11, at 247-49; RIKER,
supra note 12, at 21; JERRY COOPER, THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD 1 (1997).
14. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS
279 (1981).
15. I decline to use the term "standard modelers" or "standard model" to refer to those
who advocate alternate views of the Second Amendment, as this term implies something
standard, orthodox, or historically mainstream about this point of view, which, in my view is not
the case.
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academic interest in the Second Amendment was "a recently
unearthed series of clues to the Framers' intentions."'1 6 Two examples
are cited in the article. One is an allegedly recently discovered "early
draft" of the Second Amendment authored by James Madison where
"he made 'The right of the people' the first clause [of the Second
Amendment] .... "' The second is a letter written by Thomas
Jefferson to an English scholar, John Cartwright, in which "Jefferson
wrote that 'the constitutions of most of our states assert, that all
power is inherent in the people;.., that it is their right and duty to be
at all times armed.""'  Despite the article's claim to the contrary,
neither of these quotes is "recently unearthed," nor are they "clues"
to the meaning of the Second Amendment. The first of these quotes
has been known to constitutional scholars for decades, as it was part
of Madison's original Bill of Rights resolution, offered in the House
of Representatives on June 7, 1789 and has been a part of publicly
available congressional records from that day to this. It has also been
cited in past writings on the Second Amendment and the Bill of
Rights.19 It is thus no new discovery, nor does it alter what is already
known about the Second Amendment.
2 0
The Jefferson letter to Cartwright was reprinted in The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson,2' published in 1904. Leaving aside the facts that
Jefferson did not attend the Constitutional Convention of 1787, was
not a member of the First Congress, and penned the letter in question
in 1824, the full quotation from which the brief excerpt above was
drawn makes clear what Jefferson was writing about:
The constitutions of most of our States assert, that all power is
inherent in the people; that they may exercise it by themselves, in
all cases to which they think themselves competent (as in electing
functionaries executive and legislative, and deciding by a jury of
themselves, in all judiciary cases in which any fact is involved,) or
they may act by representatives, freely and equally chosen; that it is
their right and duty to be at all times armed; that they are entitled
16. Collin Levey, Liberals Have Second Thoughts on the Second Amendment, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 22, 1999, § A, at 23.
17. Id.
18. Id. No citations or attributions are provided in the article as to who made these
"discoveries," or who claimed that they are new or significant.
19. Recent cites of this early version of Madison are included in SPITZER, supra note 1, at
34, which in turn appeared in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 10.
20. See SPITZER, supra note 1, at 25-27.
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (1824), reprinted in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, MEMORIAL EDITION 45 (Lipscomb & Bergh, eds. 1903-04).
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to freedom of person, freedom of religion, freedom of property,
and freedom of the press.
2
Jefferson was referring to state constitutions and offering a seat-of-
the-pants listing of Bill of Rights freedoms, therefore including the
reference to being armed as a right and duty (remembering that
federal and state laws then required men of militia age to be so armed
for militia service). Nothing Jefferson said in this letter amounts to a
new contribution to the understanding of the Second Amendment,
nor does it contradict existing meaning. Yet a reader of the Wall
Street Journal might reasonably conclude that these so-called new
"clues" to Second Amendment are both, when in fact, they are
neither. Before addressing the substance of the arguments raised by
individualist writers in law journals, brief additional attention to how
these arguments have been framed in recent news and opinion
articles sheds further light on how this debate has been promoted.
II. LIBERAL, LIBERAL, LIBERAL
Two particular claims have surfaced with increasing regularity in
the media pertaining to new interpretations of the Second
Amendment in what is generally described as the "individualist"
view. 23 One is the claim, offered with considerable rhetorical flourish,
that the individualist view has recently been embraced by liberals.
For example, the New York Times noted with much ballyhoo that
"the influential liberal constitutional law expert ' 24 Laurence Tribe
now believes that the Second Amendment might protect an
individual right to own firearms.25 Columnist William Safire also
noted that some liberals seemed to be shifting positions on the issue,26
an observation made as well by newspaper columnist Walter Shapiro
and writer Daniel Lazare. 27 A recent headline in the Wall Street
Journal summed up this alleged tidal shift in liberal thought this way:
"Liberals Have Second Thoughts on the Second Amendment. 28 The
effort to assert that the individualist view, as well as generalized
22. Id.
23. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
24. William Glaberson, Right to Bear Arms: A Second Look, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1999, §
4, at 3.
25. Id.
26. See William Safire, An Appeal for Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1999, at A31.
27. See Daniel Lazare, Your Constitution Is Killing You, HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 1999, at 57-
65; Walter Shapiro, It's High Time to Gun Down the 2nd Amendment, USA TODAY, Sept. 17,
1999, at 14A.
28. See Levey, supra note 16, at 23.
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opposition to gun control, is not limited to political conservatives is
not a new phenomenon; it has percolated up from the arguments of
several legal and academic writers who oppose stronger gun laws.29
Some think, therefore, or would like others to think, that the personal
ideological leanings of those who write on the Second Amendment
offer some insight into the debate itself.
Yet, this recent debate over whether some liberals now embrace
the individualist view is a red herring, precisely because the focus on
ideological pedigree becomes a substitute for a substantive debate of
the actual merits of the individualist claims. Indeed, the merits of the
claims concerning the meaning of the Second Amendment are not
even raised in most of the press articles just cited. The facts of the
case are irrelevant if the debate over this, or any legal or public policy
issue becomes one of the ideological pedigrees of those on each side.
As a political tactic, there may be some gain to be had in trying to
legitimate an argument by extolling the people who hold it or by
noting that the position is held by people of multiple ideological
stripes (assuming, of course, that one can accept such claims at face
value). I argue in this Article, however, that such claims are, at best,
an irrelevant distraction to determining what the Second Amendment
actually means.30 At worst, such claims represent a shoddy effort to
give legitimacy to a claim that cannot stand purely on its merits.
29. For example, legal writer and individualist architect Don B. Kates edited a book which
was consciously compiled to marshal "liberal skepticism about 'gun control."' RESTRICTING
HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 1-2 (1979). Similarly, criminologist Gary
Kleck, who argues in his writings against stronger gun controls, contends strenuously, even
vehemently, that he is a good liberal. At the start of two books, he provides an "Author's
Voluntary Disclosure Notice" that trumpets his devotion to liberal causes and organizations. In
his book Targeting Guns (1997) he writes of himself:
The author is a member of the American Civil Liberties Union, Amnesty International
USA, Independent Action, Democrats 2000, and Common Cause, among other
politically liberal organizations. He is a lifelong registered Democrat, as well as a
contributor to liberal Democratic candidates. He is not now, nor has he ever been, a
member of, or contributor to, the National Rifle Association, Handgun Control, Inc.
nor any other advocacy organization, nor has he received funding for research from any
such organization.
Id. at vi. One presumes this is offered somehow to enhance his credibility, although it is
difficult to see how such an exuberant embrace of partisan political organizations, and rejection
of others, can be considered a sign of objectivity. Unintentional hilarity aside, Kleck's personal
proclamation does provide a diversion from an assessment of Kleck's work based on its
objective merit.
30. Andrew Jay McClurg refers to this as the fallacy of diversion, defined as, "distorting
the reasoning process in ways intended to make the audience lose track of or ignore the real
point." Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 81 (1992).
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III. "WE WIN"
The second rhetorical device raised in recent media accounts-
one that also percolates up from academic writings 31 - is the unilateral
declaration that the individualist view represents a new academic
consensus. For example, Lazare asserts that the debate over the
Second Amendment is simply over: "The amendment does confer an
individual right to bear arms .... -32 Historian Joyce Lee Malcolm is
quoted as saying that "[i]t is very hard.., to find a historian who now
believes that it is only a collective right .... There is no one for me to
argue against anymore .... ,3 USA Today reports that "[m]ost
constitutional scholars agree with" the individualist view. 14
While one of the purposes of this Article is to examine the extent
to which this claim is actually grounded in the academic literature,
this unilateralist claim is, on its face, roughly akin to a participant in a
contest who suddenly stops competing, declares victory, and leaves in
the hope that the declaration may become fact. Like the focus on the
ideology of those who participate in the debate on the Second
Amendment, the declaration of victory is a rhetorical device that,
whether by intent or simple effect, draws attention away from the
facts of the case. It is to those facts that we now turn.
IV. THE "INDIVIDUALIST" CRITIQUE
The central critique of the court view of the Second Amendment
is that this Amendment conferred an "individual" right to bear arms,
aside or apart from any government-based militia activity.35 That is,
some argue, the ownership of firearms is a constitutionally based
protection that applies to all individuals, without any attachment to
militias or the government, just as free speech and the right to counsel
apply to all individuals. Although many variations of the individualist
critique have been spun out, the core argument is usually supported
by plucking key phrases from court cases and colonial or federal
debate that refer to a right of Americans to own and carry guns.36
31. See Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1139-1259 (1995). As the subtitle says, the authors seek to
assert that the individualist view has become the new academic consensus.
32. Lazare, supra note 27, at 58.
33. Id. at 59.
34. Shapiro, supra note 27, at 14A.
35. See SPITZER, supra note 1, at 166 n.72.
36. Much of this line of analysis relies on supporting quotes accidentally or willfully pulled
out of context that, when examined in context, support the Court's view. To pick an example,
[Vol. 76:349
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This line of analysis has three problems. First, as a matter of
constitutional law, the issue of bearing arms as it pertained to the Bill
of Rights always came back to service in a government-organized and
regulated military unit and the balance of power between the states
and the federal government. This is reflected in the two most
important historical sources of constitutional interpretation: the
records of the Constitutional Convention and those of the First
Congress when the Bill of Rights was formulated. Gun ownership
was undeniably an important component of colonial and early federal
life, but practical necessity did not and does not equal constitutional
protection. Moreover, as historian Michael Bellesiles has found,
actual firearms ownership in America has been greatly exaggerated
and mythologized.37 He reports that, from colonial times to 1850, gun
ownership never exceeded ten percent of the population, owing in
large measure to the scarcity of guns, which were difficult and
expensive to produce, and the considerable difficulty of maintaining
those that existed in working condition.38 Even though state and
federal laws required men of militia age to keep and maintain
firearms, these laws were simply not followed or enforced.
39
Second, the definition of the citizen militias at the center of this
debate was always limited to men roughly between the ages of
Stephen P. Halbrook quotes Patrick Henry's words during the Virginia Ratifying Convention as
saying, "The great object is, that every man be armed .... Every one who is able may have a
gun." Stephen P. Halbrook, To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second
Amendment, 1787-1791, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 24,25 (1982). This quote would seem to support the
view that at least some early leaders advocated general popular armament aside from militia
purposes. Yet here is the full quote from the original debates:
May we not discipline and arm them [the states], as well as Congress, if the power be
concurrent? so that our militia shall have two sets of arms, double sets of regimentals,
&c; and thus, at a very great cost, we shall be doubly armed. The great object is, that
every man be armed. But can the people afford to pay for double sets of arms, &c?
Every one who is able may have a gun. But we have learned, by experience, that,
necessary as it is to have arms, and though our Assembly has, by a succession of laws
for many years, endeavored to have the militia completely armed, it is still far from
being the case.
3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 386 (1836) (emphasis added). It is perfectly obvious that
Henry's comments are in the context of a discussion of the militia and the power balance
between the states and Congress. Numerous other such examples as this can be found; space
limits constrain the presentation of additional illustrations. Garry Wills's conclusion about this
literature is less charitable. Speaking about the individualist writers, he says that "it is the
quality of their arguments that makes them hard to take seriously." Garry Wills, Why We Have
No Right to Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62.
37. See Michael A. Bellesiles, The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States, 1760-1865,
83 J. AM. HIST. 426, 428 (1996).
38. Id.
39. See SPITZER, supra note 1, at 28.
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eighteen and forty-five. 40 That is, it always excluded a majority of the
country's adult citizens-men over forty-five, the infirm of all ages,
and women, who, of course, did not enjoy comparable political rights
to men until the twentieth century. Even among those males who
were eligible to serve, actual service in the militias was significantly
less than universal. As historian John Shy notes, the composition and
organization of American militias fluctuated according to military
necessity of place and time,41 underscoring the fact that militia's
raison d'etre was collective defense or internal security4 2 not
individual protection (while understanding that individuals might, and
surely did, obtain protection through militia action) or other private
purposes. Moreover, those who actually served "were not the men
who bore a military obligation as part of their freedom. '43 That is,
freedmen and property owners could and would opt out of militia
service, 4 while vagrants, vagabonds, and the unemployed more often
filled the ranks. 45 Even African Americans served in early militias. 6
In the Yamasee War, in South Carolina from 1715 to 1716, a militia
force of 600 white men and 400 black men defeated Native
Americans. 47 By the 1730s, escalating fears of slave revolts ended the
practice. 48 Therefore, "universal" citizen militia service and the right
to bear arms is not, and never has been, a right enjoyed by all citizens,
unlike other Bill of Rights protections such as free speech, religious
freedom, or right to counsel. This also puts to rest the idea that the
phrase "the people" in the Second Amendment somehow means all
of the people. 49
40. See 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1983).
41. See JOHN SHY, A PEOPLE NUMEROUS AND ARMED 31 (1990).
42. Shy cites as a telling example of the problem of internal security the fact that militias in
the South increasingly were used as "an agency to control slaves, and less [as] an effective
means of defense." Id. at 37. Carl T. Bogus argues persuasively that the Second Amendment
was supported by the Southern states precisely because they were seeking a guarantee to
continue to use militias for this purpose. See Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second
Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375 (1998).
43. See SHY, supra note 41, at 37-38.
44. See Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST.
COMMENTARY 235 (1999).
45. Id.
46. See SHY, supra note 41, at 31-38.
47. Id.
48. See SHY, supra note 41, at 30.
49. Obviously, the Second Amendment is talking about only those people who could serve
in a militia, as the Supreme Court made clear in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). This
argument is raised in Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the
Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 93-94 (1983). In Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club
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Third, the matter of personal or individual self-defense, whether
from wild animals or modern-day predators, does not fall within, nor
is it dependent on, the Second Amendment rubric. Nothing in the
history, construction, or interpretation of the Amendment applies or
infers such a protection. Rather, legal protection for personal self-
defense arises from the British common law tradition and modern
criminal law; not from constitutional law.50
V. THE "RIGHT OF REVOLUTION"
An additional challenge to the court view that extends the
individualist view even further is that the Second Amendment does or
should protect the ownership of arms for everyone because of an
innate "right of revolution," or as a mechanism to keep the country's
rulers responsive to the citizens. This theory, whether emphasizing
revolutionary overthrow of a regime or an "insurrectionist" use of
violence to change personnel within a regime, poses interesting
intellectual questions about natural law and the relationship between
citizens and the state. However, it does not find support anywhere in
the text, background, or court interpretation of the Second
Amendment.
The Constitution clearly and forcefully disdains anything
resembling a right of revolution, as it gives Congress the powers "to
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
v. Van De Kamp, the court of appeals rejected the idea that the phrase "the people" had the
same, uniform meaning throughout the Bill of Rights. See 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992). Some
law journal articles have asserted that a 1990 Supreme Court case, United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), ruled that the phrase "the people" in the Second Amendment
meant all citizens. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal
Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1243 n.19 (1994); G.L. Shelton, In Search of the Lost
Amendment: Challenging Federal Firearms Regulation Through the "State's Right" Interpretation
of the Second Amendment, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105 (1995); R.J. Larizza, Paranoia,
Patriotism, and the Citizen Militia Movement. Constitutional Right or Criminal Conduct?, 47
MERCER L. REV. 581, 605 (1996). Such interpretations are false, as the Verdugo-Urquidez case
has nothing to do with interpreting the Second Amendment. In fact, the case deals with the
Fourth Amendment issue of whether an illegal alien from Mexico was entitled to constitutional
protection regarding searches. In the majority decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the
meaning of the phrase "the people"-given that the phrase appears not only in several parts of
the Bill of Rights, but also in the Constitution's Preamble in order to determine its applicability
to a noncitizen. Rehnquist speculated that the phrase "seems to have been a term of art,"
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265, that probably pertains to people who have developed a
connection with the national community. Rehnquist's speculations about whether the meaning
of "the people" could be extended to a noncitizen, and his two passing mentions of the Second
Amendment in that discussion, shed no light, much less legal meaning, on this Amendment.
50. See JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL LAW 230-76 (1993); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, pt. I, Comment to § 2.09, at 380-81 (1985);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 707 (6th ed. 1990).
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suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions"51 in Article I, Section 8; to
suspend habeas corpus "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion" in Section
9;
5
2 and to protect individual states "against domestic Violence"5 3 if
requested to do so by a state legislature or governor in Article IV,
Section 4.54 Further, the Constitution defines treason in Article III,
Section 3: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies."55 Finally,
those suspected of treason may not avoid prosecution by fleeing to
another state, as the Constitution says in Article IV, Section 2, that
"[a] Person charged in any State with Treason... and found in
another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the
State from which he fled, be delivered up .... "I' In other words, the
Constitution specifically and explicitly gives the government the
power to forcefully suppress anything even vaguely resembling
revolution. Such revolt or revolution is by constitutional definition an
act of treason against the United States. The militias are thus to be
used to suppress, not cause, revolution or insurrection.
These powers were further detailed and expanded in the Calling
Forth Act of 1792, 7 which gave the president broad powers to use
state militias to enforce both state and federal laws in instances where
the law is ignored or in cases of open insurrection. The Second
Congress passed this Act shortly after the passage of the Bill of
Rights. In current law, these powers are further elaborated in the
United States Code sections on "Insurrection. '5 8 As Roscoe Pound
noted,
a legal right of the citizen to wage war on the government is
something that cannot be admitted .... In the urban industrial society
of today a general right to bear efficient arms so as to be enabled to
resist oppression by the government would mean that gangs could
exercise an extra-legal rule which would defeat the whole Bill of
Rights.59
Beschle observed: "History and logic do not permit one to take the
right of armed revolution as a serious proposition of positive
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
52. Id. § 9.
53. Id. art. IV, § 4.
54. Id.
55. Id. art. III, § 3.
56. Id. art. IV, § 2.
57. 1 Stat. 264 (1792).
58. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-34 (1956).
59. ROSCOE POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF
LIBERTY 90-91 (1957).
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constitutional law. Only the legal revolutions provided by the
political process are recognized by the Constitution." 60  Cornell
elaborates on the relationship between the American Revolution and
subsequent American governance by noting, "Americans did accept a
right of revolution. Such a right, however, was not a constitutional
check, but a natural right that one could not exercise under a
functional constitutional government. '6
1
Any so-called right of insurrection or revolution is carried out
against the government, which means against that government's
Constitution as well; including the Bill of Rights and the Second
Amendment. One cannot carry out a right of revolution against the
government while at the same time claiming protections within it.62
Even though the truth of this conclusion is clear enough, Akhil Amar
and Alan Hirsch do not accept it, arguing that "the Framers did
envision the militia playing precisely this double role '63 of both
suppressing revolt and fomenting it. They offer this argument
without providing any sources or documentation to support the claim
that the framers endorsed this insurrectionist purpose of the militias.
Then, even more puzzling, they retreat from their argument that
some portion of the Constitution or Bill of Rights supports armed
revolt against the government by saying that the case for violent
revolution made by the Declaration of Independence was changed by
the Constitution, which "endorsed a new kind of revolution, a
peaceful means of altering or abolishing the government" by "ballots
rather than bullets ... -64 They conclude with, "it may be a mistake
to think of the right to armed revolt as a 'constitutional' right ... "65
At last, they get it right.
One of the most startling qualities of the individualist law review
literature is the rapidity and enthusiasm with which some teachers of
law embrace the virtues of armed American insurrection. 66 Sanford
60. Donald L. Beschle, Reconsidering the Second Amendment: Constitutional Protection for
a Right of Security, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 69, 95 (1986).
61. Cornell, supra note 44, at 238.
62. As Justice Robert Jackson noted in Terminiello v. Chicago, "The choice is not between
order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger
that if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will
convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact." 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
63. AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE 174 (1998). Amar and Hirsch
seek to rebut the arguments of Dennis Henigan, Arms, Anarchy, and the Second Amendment, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 107 (1991).
64. AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 63, at 175.
65. Id. at 176.
66. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the
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Levinson, for example, states in a widely cited article published in the
Yale Law Journal that "[i]t is not my style to offer 'correct' or
'incorrect' interpretations of the Constitution. '67  Yet he then pro-
ceeds to do just that, calling into question the conventional (court)
understanding of the Second Amendment. In the process, he asserts
that the Second Amendment is an expression of republicanism that
does and should take citizen participation beyond peaceful, consti-
tutional means:
[Jiust as ordinary citizens should participate actively in
governmental decision-making through offering their own
deliberative insights, rather than be confined to casting ballots once
every two or four years for those very few individuals who will
actually make decisions, so should ordinary citizens participate in
the process of law enforcement and defense of liberty rather than rely
on professionalized peacekeepers, whether we call them standing
armies or police.68
In short, Levinson offers a bona fide constitutional argument
proposing that vigilantism and citizen violence, including armed
insurrection, against the government are legal, proper, and even
beneficial activities within the Second Amendment umbrella. The
idea that vigilantism and armed insurrection are as constitutionally
sanctioned as voting is a proposition of such absurdity that one is
struck more by its boldness than by its pretensions to seriousness.
Yet it appears repeatedly in the individualist literature.
69
Finally, in none of this writing is there any actual, specific,
scholarship-based consideration of what real revolution entails.70
Groups and individuals in modern America who most closely adhere
to a violence-based revolutionary ethos-the Silver Shirts, the Branch
Davidians, the Ku Klux Klan, the Los Angeles rioters, Lee Harvey
Oswald, John Wilkes Booth-win no admirers from the Second
Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV. 647, 669
(1994); David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007,
1009 (1994); David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution:
Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 886 n.13 (1996).
67. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642
(1989).
68. Id. at 650-51 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Larizza, supra note 49, at 581-636; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment,
Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987); Reynolds,
supra note 66, at 647-73; Van Alstyne, supra note 49, at 1236-55. A particularly egregious
example of this is David C. Williams, who says flatly that the Second Amendment "guarantees
to citizens the right to own arms, so as to be ready to make a revolution." Williams, supra note
66, at 886 n.13.
70. For an extended, classic discussion of the meaning and origins of the modem concept of
revolution, see HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 13-52 (1963).
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Amendment writers discussed here. As Carl Bogus aptly observes,
"Timothy McVeigh understands insurrectionist theory."71 Academics
who toy with any serious notions about revolutions would be well
advised to consult the voluminous scholarly literature on the subject
found in political science and related fields, which details and
underscores the extent to which violence (especially including, but
not limited to, the murder of top governmental leaders), societal
dislocation, and disruption of a nation's economic, social, and political
fabric make revolution or armed insurrection anything but a simple,
reasoned, desirable, or commensurate alternative to peaceful
methods of societal change.72 The great truism of the American
political system has been its ability to effect political change through
non violent, routinized, and orderly means. To question this
profound precept is to strike at the very root of that which makes
America virtuous.
VI. COLLATERAL CLAIMS AND THE RESEARCH RECORD
The law journal articles that advance these arguments make a
series of related, supporting claims. The articles assert that: (1) little
to nothing of any consequential scholarly nature has been published
on the Second Amendment, especially before the 1980s;73 (2) the
individualist view was the prevalent view until recent critics started
saying otherwise (i.e., what I have identified here as the "court"
view);74 (3) the courts have committed a kind of dereliction of duty
insofar as they have been all but silent or indifferent on the matter, to
the point of neglect or willful avoidance;75 and (4) alternately, that
71. Bogus, supra note 42, at 386.
72. A few classics in the field include ARENDT, supra note 70; JOHN DUNN, MODERN
REVOLUTIONS (1972); ERIC R. WOLF, PEASANT WARS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1969).
One commentator who offers meaningful and valuable analysis of the military consequences of
revolutions and peasant uprisings is Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Revolt of the Masses: Armed
Civilians and the Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643
(1995).
73. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 31, at 1141; R.G. Cottrol & R.T. Diamond, The Second
Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 311 (1991);
Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed
Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 72 (1992); Levinson, supra note 67, at 658;
Lund, supra note 69, at 104; Reynolds, supra note 66, at 647; Shelton, supra note 49, at 108-10.
74. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 31, at 1141; Scott Bursor, Toward a Functional
Framework for Interpreting the Second Amendment, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (1996); Don B.
Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 87 (1992).
75. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 73, at 310; Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence
of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1981); David T. Hardy,
Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.
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since three of the four Supreme Court rulings on the Second
Amendment came in the nineteenth century, court doctrine is
somehow defective, irrelevant, outdated, unclear, emaciated, or
"embarrassing," in particular because the three are pre-
incorporation.7 6 Each of these claims is false.
77
In order to assess these claims and to simultaneously understand
the provenance of Second Amendment writings as they have
unfolded in the law literature, I examined nearly 300 law journal
articles dealing with gun control and the Second Amendment,
published from 1912 to 1999, as cited in, and culled from, the Index to
Legal Periodicals. I began my search of the Index from its beginning
with the first volume, published in 1888, through the October 1999
Index under the subject headings "weapons" and "right to bear
arms. ' 78 Book reviews were omitted, as were articles that discussed,
but did not take any clear position on, the meaning of the Second
Amendment. Of the nearly 300 cited articles that I examined, 164
articles offered significant comment or assessment concerning
interpretation of the Second Amendment. All of these articles are
listed chronologically in the Appendix to this Article, and are
categorized according to whether they argue for the court or
individualist view.
The first article I encountered was published in 1912 in the
American Law Review. 9 It discusses a case arising from the Supreme
L. & PUB. POL'Y 559 (1986); Levinson, supra note 67, at 641; Lund, supra note 69, at 104; Van
Alstyne, supra note 49, at 1239-40.
76. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193, 1264 (1992); Hardy, supra note 75, at 559-60; Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition
and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 214, 218 (1983);
Levinson, supra note 67, at 654; Lund, supra note 69, at 103; Thomas M. Moncure, The Second
Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 How. L.J. 589, 592 (1991); Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical
Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 498 (1995); Jay R. Wagner, Comments, Gun
Control Legislation and the Intent of the Second Amendment: To What Extent Is There an
Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1407, 1410 (1992).
77. See infra Table I.
78. I conducted my search at the Cornell University Law Library. The earliest printed
edition of the Index to Legal Periodicals in the library was titled AN INDEX TO LEGAL
PERIODICAL LITERATURE, by Leonard A. Jones (1888). It indexed articles from 158 law
journals and reviews written prior to 1887. I excluded from my search books as well as articles
on the Second Amendment appearing in the publications of other disciplines, such as history,
since my deliberate purpose is to chronicle publications on this subject within the law journal
community, where virtually all of this writing has taken place. In my search, I used the Index
cites to identify articles that likely considered Second Amendment issues, and to weed out those
that did not. Based on a list of likely candidates drawn from the Index, I then went to the bound
volumes of law journals to personally examine each article, to see if it did in fact analyze the
Second Amendment, and to then discern the article's spin, which then constituted the
bibliographic data found in this Article's Appendix.
79. See The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms and Statutes Against Carrying
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Court of Georgia involving a challenge to a state law that required
persons wishing to carry a handgun to first obtain a license to do so
from the state.80 Challenged as a violation of the Constitution's
Second Amendment and as a violation of a comparable provision in
the Georgia State Constitution, the court ruled in favor of the
restriction .8 Discussing the broader principle of the meaning of the
Second Amendment, the article stated that
[t]he many decisions which have already been made as to statutes
against carrying concealed weapons or weapons of a certain character
show two general lines of reasoning; first, that such provisions should
be construed in the light of the origin of the constitutional
declarations and the necessity for an efficient militia or for the
common defense; second, that they should be construed in connection
with the general police power of the state and as subject to legislative
regulation thereunder.
82
A second, brief article appeared in Law Notes in 1913, speculating on
a legal challenge to a New York state gun law and citing Presser v.
Illinois.83
Two years later, the first full-blown treatment of the Second
Amendment appeared in the Harvard Law Review.m Authored by
noted constitutional scholar Lucilius Emery, the article discusses the
British tradition behind the Second Amendment, pertinent American
history, and various comparable state constitutional provisions.
Emery quotes Presser, and concludes that "[o]nly persons of military
capacity to bear arms in military organizations are within the spirit of
the guaranty [i.e., the Second Amendment]." '85 Emery ends by saying
that "the carrying of weapons by individuals may be regulated,
restricted, and even prohibited according as conditions and
circumstances may make it necessary for the protection of the
people. '86 Emery's article was widely reprinted.87
Weapons, 46 AM. L. REV. 777, 777-79 (1912) [hereinafter The Constitutional Right to Keep and
Bear Arms and Statutes Against Carrying Weapons].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms and Statutes Against Carrying
Weapons, supra note 79, at 778.
83. Right to Bear Arms, 16 LAW NoTEs 207-08 (1913) (citing Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S.
252 (1886)).
84. See Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L.
REV. 473, 473-77 (1915).
85. Id. at 476.
86. Id. at 477.
87. These reprints were cited in the Index of Legal Periodicals, but are not included in the
Appendix to this Article.
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Including these three early articles, a total of eleven articles on
the Second Amendment appeared in law journals from 1912 to 1959.
All of them reflected what is here labeled the "court" view of the
Second Amendment-namely, that the Second Amendment affects
citizens only in connection with citizen service in a government-
organized and regulated militia. Then in 1960, an article published by
Stuart R. Hays88 raised two new Second Amendment arguments that
would appear often in subsequent articles. One argument asserted
that the Second Amendment supported an individual or personal
right to have firearms (notably for personal self-defense), separate
and apart from citizen service in a government militia. The second
novel argument was that the Second Amendment created a citizen
"right of revolution," one that, in Hays's opinion, was properly
exercised by the American South during the Civil War. In Hays's
words, "The Southern States... were engaged in a lawful
revolution. '89 Hays rested these two arguments primarily on his
assertion that the English tradition defined the "right to bear arms"
as incorporating both a right of revolution and a right of personal self-
defense.90
The Hays article incorporated an array of errors and omissions.
First and foremost, his analysis of Second Amendment meaning failed
to consider key primary evidence on the meaning of the Bill of
Rights, namely the debate at the First Congress. Hays's article based
much of its analysis on a misreading of prior British history. 91 It
incorrectly cited Dred Scott v. Sandford92 as applicable to Second
Amendment interpretation and misspelled Chief Justice Roger Taney
as "Tanney", 93 it incorrectly labeled the court's opinion in Presser v.
Illinois,94 written by Justice Woods, as a "dissent", 95 it miscited and
misspelled the case of United States v. Cruikshank96 as Cruickshank v.
United States,97 and it cited the wrong years for the cases of Miller v.
88. See Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2
WM. & MARY L. REV. 381 (1960).
89. Id. at 403.
90. See Hays, supra note 88, at 381-82.
91. Id. Compare id., with Bogus, supra note 42, at 375-85.
92. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (concerning whether a slave living in a
free state was entitled to citizenship rights; decision later overturned by the passage of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
93. See Hays, supra note 88, at 397.
94. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
95. See Hays, supra note 88, at 401 (there was no dissent in Presser).
96. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
97. See Hays, supra note 88, at 399.
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Texas98 (1894, not 1893), Presser (1886, not 1885), and Robertson v.
Baldwin99 (1897, not 1899).100 While some of these errors are minor,
when added together they summarize an article whose scholarship,
produced by the author while he was a student, 1 1 was less than
reliable. On this broken reed, subsequent individualist analysis was
built.
Turning to Table I of this Article and the light it sheds on the
various collateral claims arising from individualist writings pertaining
to the first claim that little or nothing of a scholarly nature has been
published on the meaning of the Second Amendment, thirty-nine law
journal articles, all referenced in the Index to Legal Periodicals, were
published on the Second Amendment from 1912 to 1980.
Interestingly, only nine of these took the individualist position. If any
criticism can be leveled at these thirty-nine articles, it is that they
cover the ground too well, to the point of redundancy. This assertion
of little scholarly writing also carries within it a second, implicit,
assertion-that any relative handful of articles, by virtue of their
small number, ipso facto cannot have adequately examined and
discussed the issue in question. Obviously, this judgment is false,
absent a content analysis of the articles, since a single, careful article
might indeed examine with adequate depth and care any given
subject. Beyond this, to say that few articles have been written on
this subject is, in and of itself, false. In any case, the focus on simple
numbers of articles says nothing about whether this, or any, subject
has received adequate, proper, or appropriate treatment.
The second assertion, that the individualist view was the
dominant one, is also contradicted by Table I of this Article and by
the existence of twenty-two articles taking the court view published
over the span of fifty-eight years, from 1912 to 1970, compared with
just three articles taking the individualist view, with all three
published in the 1960s. In fact, the Table reveals that the individualist
position has proliferated only since the 1980s, with twenty-one
individualist articles published from 1980 to 1989, compared to
98. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
99. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
100. See Hays, supra note 88, at 400 nn.82 & 84, 402 n.88.
101. According to the Alumni Office at the College of William and Mary School of Law,
Hays received his undergraduate B.A. degree from William and Mary in 1957, and a B.C.L.
degree from the law school in 1960. Hays also served as an editor of the William and Mary Law
Review, had been a hunter and gun collector since before his law school days, and also had
become a life member of the National Rifle Association before law school. Interview with
Stuart R. Hays (Dec. 15 1999).
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seventeen taking the court view. 102 The numbers jumped again in the
1990s, with fifty-eight articles taking the individualist view, and
twenty-nine taking the court view. The assertion that the
individualist view has been the dominant one is also contradicted by
standard reference works. For example, in his standard work on the
Constitution, Jack Peltason says that the Second Amendment "was
designed to prevent Congress from disarming the state militias, not to
prevent it from regulating private ownership of firearms."'' 3 In his
classic book on the Bill of Rights, Irving Brant says that "[t]he Second
Amendment, popularly misread, comes to life chiefly on the parade
floats of rifle associations and in the propaganda of mail-order houses
selling pistols to teenage gangsters." 1°4  Similar, less sarcastic
sentiments are found in other standard works. 105
The third assertion-that the courts have committed a kind of
dereliction of duty with respect to the Second Amendment-is also
false, given the existence of four Supreme Court cases- United States
v. Cruikshank,1°6 Presser v. Illinois,107 Miller v. Texas,1°8 and United
States v. Miller,09 including a brief acknowledgment of this line of
cases in Lewis v. United States"1 0-all of which explicate and support
the aforementioned court interpretation that the Second Amendment
102. Don B. Kates has been quick to mischaracterize the literature, saying that before the
1980s there was "scant historical support" for the court/collective view (an assertion
contradicted by the bibliographic data presented here), and as seen also in his false assertion
that "thirty-six law review articles" addressed the Second Amendment from 1980 to the early
1990s, and that "only four" take the court/collectivist view. Don B. Kates, Jr., Gun Control:
Separating Reality from Symbolism, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 353, 359 (1994). According to Table I of
this Article, thirty-eight articles dealt with the subject from 1980 to 1989, with another twenty-
four published from 1990 to 1993 (the year before the publication of Kates's article); totaling
sixty-two articles. Of the sixty-two, twenty-six take the court/collectivist view, not four.
103. JACK PELTASON, CORWIN AND PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION
168 (1988).
104. IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 486 (1965).
105. Edward Dumbauld says that "[t]he Second and Third Amendments stand simply as the
empty symbol of what remains a living American ideal: the supremacy of the civil power over
the military." He also notes that "these amendments are defunct in practice." THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 62-3 (1957); see also JOHN SEXTON & NAT BRANDT, How FREE ARE WE? 209-10
(1986). In the words of Robert A. Rutland, the Second Amendment (along with the Third,
having to do with the quartering of troops in peoples' homes) has become "obsolete." THE
BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 229 (1955). Standard legal reference works used by lawyers and
judges parallel this perspective. See AMERICAN LAW REPORTS 700-29 (1983). In 1975, the
American Bar Association endorsed the understanding that the Second Amendment is
connected with militia service, as has the ACLU. See Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke
from the Right to Bear Arms and the Second Amendment, 29 AKRON L. REV. 57, 65 n.29 (1995).
106. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
107. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
108. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
109. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
110. 445 U.S. 90 (1980).
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comes into play only in connection with citizen service in a
government-organized and regulated militia and that this Amend-
ment has not been incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment,
despite the opportunity to do so afforded by numerous lower-court
appeals spanning the last fifty years. Further, these recent lower
federal court opinions have been even more emphatic and detailed in
asserting that, as the Ninth Circuit noted in 1996, "We follow our
sister circuits in holding that the Second Amendment is a right held
by the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a
private citizen."'11 The inescapable conclusion is that the Supreme
Court, especially as amplified by lower federal courts, has settled this
matter and has no interest in crowding its docket with cases that
merely repeat what has already been decided. The high court may, of
course, change its mind on the matter, and there is reason to believe
that two justices are interested in revisiting the subject. Justice
Clarence Thomas noted in his concurring opinion in Printz v. United
States that:
This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of
the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment. If,
however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal right
to "keep and bear arms," a colorable argument exists that the
Federal Government's regulatory scheme ... runs afoul of that
Amendment's protection. As the parties did not raise this
argument, however, we need not consider it here.
1 2
Justice Antonin Scalia raised similar suggestions."3 Be that as it may,
federal court rulings up until the present are uniform in their
111. Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Nelson, 859
F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988). Other federal court rulings making the same point include:
Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922-23 (lst Cir. 1942), cert. denied sub nom. Velazquez v.
United States, 319 U.S. 770 (1943); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd
on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. McCutcheon, 446 F.2d 133, 135-36 (7th Cir. 1971); Stevens v. United
States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 36-37 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); Eckert v. Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548,
550 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1977); United States. v.
Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); Quilici v. Morton
Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Thomas v. Members
of City Council of Portland, 730 F.2d 41, 42(1st Cir. 1984); Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041
(11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 753 (1991); Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de
Camp, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992); Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 168 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812, 812 (1969), where a Second Amendment appeal was "dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question."
112. 521 U.S. 898, 938-39 (1997).
113. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 43 (1997).
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interpretation. The one exception to this is the recent case of United
States v. Emerson,14 in which a federal district court judge ruled that a
man who was charged with violating a restraining order that included
a gun ownership restriction (after the man brandished a handgun in
the presence of his estranged wife and child) did, in fact, have a
Second Amendment right to own the gun. As of this writing, the case
is on appeal."5
The fourth assertion-that three of the four key Supreme Court
cases on the Second Amendment came in the nineteenth century and
are therefore somehow irrelevant or deficient-is transparently false,
since no legal doctrine imposes a statute of limitations or expiration
date on binding court precedent unless the precedent is ignored or
overturned, neither of which has occurred for Second Amendment
law. 116 While it is true that the three earlier cases were decided before
the Supreme Court began the piecemeal incorporation of the Bill of
Rights in 1897, the process has never been extended by the Court to
the entire Bill of Rights.',7 The last incorporation case came in 1969,
and the process is generally considered to be at an end, with the
possible exception of the Excessive Fines and Bails Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.'1 8 Since then, the Third Amendment, the Grand
Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment, the
Fines and Bails Clause, as well as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
114. 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
115. The case raises a host of questions, not the least of which that it relies almost
exclusively on the individualist law journal literature, and ignores the three nineteenth-century
Supreme Court cases on the Second Amendment, saying simply that they are not "modern."
Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 608. Since this case is on appeal as of this writing, it is not analyzed
here.
116. Thomas M. Moncure says that the three nineteenth-century cases "are as unillustrative
as they are unpleasant." Moncure, supra note 76, at 592. Whether true or not, I know of no
legal doctrine that invalidates cases because of these traits.
117. The late Supreme Court Justices John Marshall Harlan, William 0. Douglas, and Hugo
Black argued for total incorporation of the Bill of Rights, but no one else on the court has since
embraced such an argument. The first incorporation case applied the Fifth Amendment
protection to the states pertaining to just compensation in cases of eminent domain in Chicago,
Burlington, and Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Other significant
incorporation cases included First Amendment free speech in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); First Amendment press freedom in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); First
Amendment religious freedom in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S.
245 (1934); First Amendment freedom of assembly and petitioning the government for redress
of grievances in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Fourth Amendment search and
seizure in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy in
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). For an excellent summary of incorporation, see
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 28-91 (1972).
118. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS
279 (1981).
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have not been incorporated. The pre-incorporation Second
Amendment cases thus continue to stand as good law.'19
VII. SEEKING SHELTER UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
This discussion of incorporation raises an additional, related
argument offered by a few-namely, that the Fourteenth
Amendment somehow created, enhanced, or validated a
constitutionally-based individual right to bear arms aside or apart
from citizen militia service. To support this claim, advocates
generally cite post-Civil War debate in Congress that referenced the
Second Amendment or the bearing of arms. Typical of these claims is
that of Stephen Halbrook, who quotes Senator Jacob M. Howard's
(R-MI) comments during debate over the Fourteenth Amendment in
1866, "When he introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress,
Senator Jacob M. Howard... referred to 'the personal rights
guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution; such as freedom of speech and of the press; ... the right
to keep and bear arms."''' 0 Halbrook makes two claims from this and
related quotes. One is that the reference to "personal rights,"
apparently offered in the same context as mention of the right to bear
arms, means that this "personal right" is an "individual right." ' The
second claim is to argue for total incorporation-i.e., application of
all of the Bill of Rights to the states.122 While even this abbreviated
quote suggests that Senator Howard was merely listing the parts of
the Bill of Rights, the full quote from Senate debate clarifies the point
further:
To these privileges and immunities [spoken of in Article IV of the
Constitution], whatever they may be-for they are not and cannot
be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature-to these
should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the
first eight amendments of the Constitution; such as the freedom of
speech and of the press [First Amendment]; the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances, a right appertaining to each and all the people [First
119. The Courts of Appeal have repeatedly recognized the validity of the earlier Supreme
Court cases dealing with the Second Amendment. Some individualist writers misconstrue
incorporation entirely. Halbrook, for example, claims that the Presser case "plainly suggests
that the Second Amendment applies to the States through the fourteenth amendment" when in
fact the court said precisely the opposite. Halbrook, supra note 36, at 85.
120. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 112 (1984).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Amendment]; the right to keep and bear arms [Second
Amendment]; the right to be exempted from the quartering of
soldiers in a house without the consent of the owner [Third
Amendment]; the right to be exempt from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and from any search or seizure except by virtue of a
warrant issued upon formal oath or affidavit [Fourth Amendment];
the right of an accused person to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him, and his right to be tried by an impartial jury
of the vicinage [Sixth Amendment]; and also the right to be secure
against excessive bail and against cruel and unusual punishments
[Eighth Amendment].
123
It is clear from the full quote that the Senator's reference to "personal
rights" was simply a synonym for all of the rights of the Bill of Rights.
There is no reason to believe that this reference articulates, or
implies, an individual right to bear arms aside or apart from the
conventional understanding of citizen participation in a government-
organized and regulated militia. As for the question of full
incorporation of the Bill of Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
one may argue that this quote supports the contention. While the
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to provide
for total incorporation is a minority viewpoint among constitutional
scholars (and it has been rejected by the courts), it is at least a bona
fide argument. The claim that the Fourteenth Amendment somehow
created, elevated, or ratified an individual right to bear arms, either as
part of the Second or Fourteenth Amendments, is not.124 In any case,
to make such an argument about the Fourteenth Amendment is also
to argue implicitly that the Second Amendment, as originally drafted,
did not create such an individual right in the first place. Otherwise,
there would be no reason to resort to the Fourteenth to support such
a line of reasoning. Amar, in fact, makes this argument explicitly
when he says that "[c]reation-era arms bearing was collective...
Reconstruction gun-toting was individualistic.... ",,25
Quinlan offers the same kind of analysis when, for example, he
123. ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 219 (1967).
124. Michael J. Quinlan makes the same error in Is There a Neutral Justification for Refusing
to Implement the Second Amendment or Is the Supreme Court Just "Gun Shy"?, 22 CAP. U. L.
REV. 661 (1993).
125. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 259 (1998). Amar concludes that the
Second Amendment "was reglossed by a later constitutional text [i.e., the Fourteenth
Amendment]." Id. at 297. Amar cites the same kind of sources as Halbrook to support his
"floor wax" theory of this supposed relationship between the two amendments. In his analysis,
Amar confuses politics and law, citing congressional debate over southern turmoil to support his
argument, yet he never cites, or even mentions, the Cruikshank or Presser cases (or for that
matter Miller v. United States), which falsify his argument.
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quotes Representative Roswell Hart (R-NY) during a House debate
in 1866, who said citizens:
[S]hall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of other citizens;
[where] no law shall be made prohibiting the free exercise of
religion; [where] the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; [where] the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
12 6
From this quote, Quinlan concludes that "[a]pparently, several
commentators in the Reconstruction Congress considered the Second
Amendment's right to keep and bear arms an individual right. 12 7
Once again, the speaker is simply reciting Bill of Rights protections,
as demarcated by the use of quotation marks. The quote does
nothing to support the individualist view, as even Quinlan's use of the
modifier "apparently" suggests.
Halbrook expands this Fourteenth Amendment analysis when he
attempts to link together the Fourteenth Amendment with the
Freedman's Bureau Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, so
he can draw on the debate and text of these bills to argue that, when
taken together, they provide "the rights to personal security and
personal liberty [and] include the 'constitutional right to bear
arms. ' 128 Again, Halbrook culls congressional and state debate for
any and all references to firearms, the bearing of arms, and the like.
Not only is Halbrook seeking to argue that "the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to incorporate the Second Amendment,"
but further to argue that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights to personal security and
personal liberty, which its authors declared in the Freedmen's
Bureau Act to include "the constitutional right to bear arms." To
the members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, possession of arms was
a fundamental, individual right worthy of protection from both
federal and state violation. 29
In other words, beyond arguing for total incorporation, Halbrook
argues that the Fourteenth Amendment itself protects the bearing of
arms.
This line of reasoning has several obvious problems. First and
foremost, while it is true that the same Congress sought to extend
126. Quinlan, supra note 124, at 662.
127. Id.
128. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876, at viii (1998).
129. Id. at 43.
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similar, basic rights through the trio of enactments, including the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment simply does
not stipulate anything like a right to bear arms. No court has ever
found, or suggested, that the Second Amendment was somehow
repeated, amplified, or elevated by the Fourteenth. And while
similar, each of these three enactments is, as a matter of law,
different, and to attempt to draw out legislative intent behind one
enactment (the Fourteenth Amendment) by bringing in others (the
Civil Rights Act and the Freedmen's Bureau Act) is both desperate
and erroneous. 30
Second, the discussion of arms, personal security, and militias in
Congress during this time is by no means a discussion that revolves
solely around the Second Amendment. Remember that the
American South was in a state of near-total destruction and utter
chaos, a fact heightened by the race hatred found in the region in the
aftermath of the freeing of millions of former slaves and by the
presence of thousands of former Confederate soldiers who were
allowed to keep their arms. Little wonder that there was so much
discussion in Congress of security and safety issues.
Third, as an interpretation of the Second Amendment, the
congressional debates of the 1860s deserve no special, if any,
consideration. These debates were not debates over the meaning of
that Amendment per se, occurring as they did over seventy years
after adoption of the Bill of Rights. They were political debates over
how best to extend hard-won rights, restore order, and reconfigure
governance in the American South.
Fourth, the yearning for total incorporation, or any kind of
elevation of the Second Amendment, was rejected by political
contemporaries. Eight years after adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the idea in United
States v. Cruikshank.1' Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Waite
wrote:
130. Akhil Reed Amar also wants to argue for a kind of total incorporation by saying that
the Second Amendment right to bear arms-and presumably all other rights and
freedoms in the Bill of Rights-were encompassed by both the Freedman's Bureau
Act and its companion Civil Rights Act. (Of course, adoption of both Acts
presupposed congressional power to impose the general requirements of the Bill of
Rights on states. [Rep.] Bingham... denied that Congress had such power, and
therefore argued that a constitutional amendment was required to validate the Civil
Rights Act.)
Amar, supra note 76, at 1245 n.228. Amar does note the key difference between the two bills
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
131. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876).
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The second and tenth counts are equally defective. The right there
specified is that of 'bearing arms for a lawful purpose.' This is not a
right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner
dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second
Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has
been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by
Congress. This is one of the Amendments that has no other effect
than to restrict the powers of the national government. 32
In 1873, the Supreme Court dealt total incorporation what
constitutional scholar Henry J. Abraham has called "a crushing
defeat" in The Slaughterhouse Cases.133  The thinking of most
constitutional scholars on this subject is summarized by Andrea L.
Bonnicksen this way: "A look at the debates surrounding the framing
of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals some evidence that the
members of Congress did intend the Amendment's due process
clause to incorporate the Bill of Rights, but the more compelling
evidence shows otherwise.' 13 4 As discussed earlier, the Court did not
incorporate any part of the Bill of Rights until 1897. This fact alone
puts to rest Halbrook's assertions.
The research tactic applied to attempting to find a connection
between the Fourteenth and Second Amendments follows that
described by Garry Wills in characterizing individualist research on
the Second Amendment: "The tactic.., is to ransack any document,
no matter how distant from the.., debates, in the hope that
someone, somewhere, ever used 'bear arms' in a non-military
way ..."135 In the case of incorporation, this search extends,
fruitlessly, to eight decades after the writing of the Second
Amendment.
Despite this array of chimerical claims, the law journal article
count in Table I shows an explosion of individualist articles, such that
a recent article has dubbed its individualist view as "The New
Consensus on the Second Amendment.'13 6 The key prop of the claim
is the sheer number of such articles, as though the weight of numbers
creates a kind of intellectual precedent. Yet given the parade of bad
132. Id. Halbrook erroneously asserts that, in the Cruikshank case, "the Supreme Court did
not consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the rights to assemble and keep
and bear arms against the states." HALBROOK, supra note 128, at 172.
133. ABRAHAM, supra note 117, at 43; see also The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 62 (1872).
134. ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 2 (1982).
135. Wills, supra note 36, at 257-58.
136. See generally BARNETT & KATES, supra note 31, at 1139-1260; see also Bursor, supra
note 74, at 1125-51.
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analysis these articles represent, how can this phenomenon be
explained? Three considerations help explain the presence of this
body of analysis: the law journal breeding ground, the presence of the
state in law, and partisan support.
VIII. THE LAW JOURNAL BREEDING GROUND
The discipline of law is unique among academic disciplines in
that its professional journals are governed mostly by student-run law
review boards, and with a few exceptions, submissions are not subject
to the process of peer review, or even faculty oversight.'37 The
consequences of these facts for law review content have been
extensively discussed and debated within the law school community,
and have at least two particular effects pertinent to this analysis.
First, while the peer review process found in every other discipline is
subject to legitimate criticisms, including cronyism and institutional
conservatism, law review student editors simply do not possess, and
cannot be expected to possess, the knowledge and expertise of those
who have researched and published in a field. Second, law reviews
seek and reward, through publication of articles that are, by the
field's own admission, highly duplicative and unnecessarily packed
with footnotes, phenomena that are readily apparent when reading
these articles. This occurs in a contemporary atmosphere where there
is a proliferation, even glut of law reviews-more than 800 by one
count. 38 Given such a huge publishing hole, these characteristics
have increasingly produced a contrary editorial drive to publish
articles for their distinctiveness rather than their scholarly soundness.
These and other criticisms emerge from the legal profession itself.139
137. See Rosa Ehrenreich, Look Who's Editing, LINGUA FRANCA, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 58-63;
Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 615-88 (1996); Christopher Shea, Students v. Professors, 2 CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. A33-34 (1995). Faculty oversight has actually declined since 1970, although there has
been a recent revival of the call for greater faculty control. See Roger C. Cramton, "The Most
Remarkable Institution": The American Law Review, 35 J.L. EDUC. 6 (1986).
138. See Ehrenreich, supra note 137, at 60.
Having taught students, and graded student papers, for over 20 years, I am
struck by the fact that students would typically identify two traits of writing,
commonly found in law journals, as signs of excellence: length (the longer a
work is, the better it must be) and the number of footnotes (more equalling
better).
Id.
139. The law school community has engaged in much soul-searching and self-criticism on
this matter, going back many decades. See Special Issue, 30 AKRON L. REV. (1996); Special
Issue, 47 STAN. L. REV. (1995); Symposium on Law Review Editing: The Struggle Between
Author and Editor over Control of the Text, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 71 (1994). Oliver Wendell
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In the words of one member of the legal community, law reviews are
"dominated by rather exotic offerings."140 Another critic notes the
simultaneous drives that produce both duplication and
distinctiveness: "Student editors prefer pieces that recite prior
developments at great length, contain voluminous and largely
meaningless citations for every proposition, and deal with topics that
are either safe and standard on the one hand, or currently faddish on
the other.'141 The matter of redundancy also sets legal publications
apart from the scholarly literature of virtually every other discipline.
It is almost unimaginable that so many repetitive publications would
find their way into print in political science or other disciplines,
because redundancy is an obvious and typical ground for rejection.
These unique publishing conditions help explain the trends described
in this Article.142  In addition, the sheer volume of publishing
possibilities provides a uniquely wide opportunity for the cultivation
and propagation of particular legal theories, since even a tiny
percentage of law review articles devoted to a particular argument
could easily amount to dozens of published articles.
Much modern constitutional and legal analysis has fallen
primarily, if not entirely, to the legal community and its scholarly
mouthpiece, law reviews. This fact is not offered as a criticism of the
legal community, which indisputably produces a great deal of fine
scholarship, including in the realm of the Second Amendment. Yet,
while law reviews produce important and valuable scholarship, the
unique review and publishing characteristics of these journals, as they
reflect their discipline, have opened the door to highly suspect bodies
of analysis. As Garry Wills noted in his analysis of the individualist
school of Second Amendment writing, "It seems as if our law journals
were being composed by Lewis Carroll using various other
pseudonyms.' 143 The case of the new interpretations of the Second
Amendment discussed here support the proposition that law reviews
Holmes, Jr., brushed law reviews aside as the "work of boys." Hibbitts, supra note 137, at 631.
140. See Hibbitts, supra note 137, at 647-48. Despite continued, even growing criticism of
student control of law reviews, students continue to control an ever-growing number of such
publications.
141. Cramton, supra note 137, at 8.
142. It may also be that intellectual traits stemming from legal training contribute to the
trends described here, such as the adversarial principle, and the reasonable doubt standard, but
these questions are beyond the scope of this Article.
143. Wills, supra note 36, at 71.
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can be a breeding ground for defective analysis and wayward public
policy.
144
IX. THE STATE IN LAW
A second explanation for the proliferation of Second
Amendment articles is predicted by political scientist Theodore J.
Lowi, who notes of his discipline that "U.S. political science is itself a
political phenomenon and, as such, is a product of the state.'
1 45 It
should come as little surprise that the same concept applies to law.
Almost without exception, the very earliest articles on the Second
Amendment paralleled and discussed changes in state public policy
concerning gun laws. These articles begin with the enactment of New
York's strict gun law, the so-called Sullivan law, in 1911, to the
Supreme Court's 1939 ruling in United States v. Miller.146  Second
Amendment publications lapsed, along with federal regulatory
efforts, until the mid-1960s when renewed focus on gun issues
culminated in the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968.147 The
next important wave of gun legislation emerged during the Reagan
administration, culminating with the enactment of the Firearm
Owners Protection Act of 1986.148 Coinciding with these legislative
changes was the country's turn to the right, and the National Rifle
Association's hard right and more politicized turn of the late 1970s
and 1980s. In the wake of this anti-gun control tide, it is logical that
supporting writings appeared in law journals and other publications.
In the last decade, unprecedented focus on the 1993 Brady Law and
the 1994 assault weapons ban and other gun policy controversies
further fanned law review writing.149 That these political phenomena
helped drive gun scholarship is clearly seen in the text of these
writings, a phenomenon of particular predictive significance in the
legal community, where law journal writings are extremely sensitive
to breaking legislative and judicial decisions.
144. For more on the argument that the legal profession's norms encourage modes of
thought that are uniquely different from other professions, and that encourage some of the
problems described here, see generally MARK C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN
POLITICS (1995).
145. Theodore J. Lowi, The State in Political Science: How We Become What We Study, 86
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (1992).
146. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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X. PARTISAN SUPPORT
A third explanation for the expanding body of individualist
scholarship pertaining to the Second Amendment is more predictably
and strictly political, in that gun advocacy groups have a vested
interest in promoting academic writing to buttress and legitimize their
political agendas. A group formed in 1992 by individuals seeking to
promote other interpretations of the Second Amendment, called
Academics for the Second Amendment ("ASA"), asserted in an open
letter that "It]he Second Amendment does not guarantee merely a
'right of the states,' but rather a 'right of the people,' a term which ...
is widely understood to encompass a personal right of citizens."'150
The organization further stated that "[o]ur primary goal is to give the
'right to bear arms' enshrined in the Bill of Rights its proper,
prominent place in Constitutional discourse and analysis."15' This
group received $6,000 from the NRA, out of a total of $90,000 raised
by the group. 152 The ASA's president, Joseph Olson, has served on
the NRA's governing board. In 1992, the NRA's Firearms Civil
Rights Legal Defense Fund contributed $5,000 to cover the expenses
for academics that attended the ASA conference that year. 153 In 1993,
the NRA's Legal Defense Fund contributed $99,000 "for undisclosed
'right to bear arms research and education. ''15 4 Further, the NRA
offered a first prize of $25,000 (a considerable amount of money in
academic circles for academic work) for its 1994-1995 essay contest
titled "Stand Up for the Second Amendment." The annual contest
"seeks publication-quality law review pieces on gun-rights issues. '155
Another group, formed in 1994, the Lawyer's Second Amendment
Society, similarly seeks to advance the individualist view through its
activities and publications.156 Further, a number of individualist
writers have ties to gun groups.
157
150. See id. at 166 n.70.
151. Id.
152. Scott Heller, The Right to Bear Arms, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 21, 1995, at A8, 12.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. A.D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic
Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 138 n.358 (1995).
156. Lawyers for the Second Amendment publishes "The Liberty Pole" six times a year, a
newsletter that advances its constitutional arguments.
157. In particular, individualist authors including Caplan, Dowlut, Gardiner, Halbrook,
Kates, Moncure, and Tahmassebi are employed by, or have worked for, the NRA or other gun
groups. These seven individuals alone account for twenty-seven of the articles listed in this
Article's Appendix (this count does not include other articles pertaining to gun control
authored or co-authored by these individuals that do not appear on this list by virtue of the fact
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According to one critic, these activities have a very specific
public policy purpose-namely, they are
part of a concerted campaign to persuade the courts to reconsider
the Second Amendment, to reject what has long been a judicial
consensus, and to adopt a different interpretation-one that would
give the Amendment judicial as well as political vitality and would
erect constitutional barriers to gun control legislation. 15
8
Aside from the now-large number of individualist articles, there is
reason to believe that these efforts have borne other fruit, given the
1999 Texas case of United States v. Emerson159 mentioned earlier, and
given the fact that Justice Thomas raised the individualist perspective
(as dicta) in his concurring opinion in Printz v. United States.160
Although the constitutional challenge to the background check
requirement of the Brady Law161 in Printz was based on the Tenth
Amendment, not the Second Amendment, in a footnote Thomas
cited individualist law review articles by Halbrook, Van Alstyne,
Amar, Cottrol and Diamond, Levinson, and Kates. 162
This is certainly not the first time that interest groups have
sought to push particular arguments in law journals as a preparatory
move to advance litigation. In 1959, political scientist Clement E.
that they do not dwell on the Second Amendment). Caplan has served on the governing board
of the NRA and as counsel to two New York State gun groups. See Constitutional Rights in
Jeopardy: The Push for Gun Control (NRA), 1998. Dowlut, Gardiner, Moncure, and
Tahmassebi have all worked for the Office of the General Counsel of the NRA. See Senate
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Judiciary Committee, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms,
97th Cong., 2d sess. iii; T.M. Moncure, Who Is the Militia, 19 LINcoLN L. REV. 1 (1990); S.B.
Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 67 (1990). Halbrook is
a leading lawyer for the NRA cause, having argued such cases as Printz v. United States. For
example, during hearings held before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Judiciary
Committee, U.S. Senate, held in Washington, D.C. on September 23, 1998, Halbrook advised
NRA President Charlton Heston during Heston's testimony before the committee. Oddly,
Halbrook does not mention his long association with the NRA when identifying himself. In his
book, FREEDMEN, supra note 128, he identifies himself as having argued Printz before the
Supreme Court, but beyond that says only that he "practices law in Fairfax, Virginia." Fairfax is
the home of the NRA. Kates is a long-time gun activist who is a regular contributor to anti-gun
control publications and advisor to anti-control activists. See, e.g., Readers Write, AM.
RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1994, at 10. He authors a regular column called "Gun Rights" that appears in
the magazine HANDGUNS. Dennis A. Henigan is chief counsel for Handgun Control, Inc., and
is the author of two collectivist articles listed in the Appendix. No other court/collectivist
author listed has authored more than two articles. I do not attach particular significance to
these interest group associations, however, because the key issue is the willingness of law
journals to accept and print these articles, rather than the occupational backgrounds or
ideological predilections of the authors.
158. Bogus, supra note 42, at 316.
159. 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
160. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
161. A law passed by Congress in 1993 that imposed a five business day waiting period on
the purchase of a handgun.
162. Printz, 521 U.S. at 946-47.
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Vose chronicled the efforts of the NAACP and sympathetic legal
scholars to "blast the constitutional log jam" that thwarted efforts to
end racial segregation (in particular, the restrictive covenant cases) by
generating sympathetic and supportive law journal articles. 163 Efforts
to dovetail academic writing with public policy advocacy are certainly
legitimate. They lose their legitimacy, however, when they sacrifice
academic standards of sound research in the process.
CONCLUSION
In the mad scramble to win legitimacy for their arguments,
individualist authors have produced an ever-growing stack of articles
sculpted to buttress their position. This near-obsessive focus on
numbers of publications has allowed them to turn the focus of the
debate away from the merits of the arguments themselves, and
toward the number of articles, and the pedigrees of the articles'
authors. In this Article, I, too, have played the numbers game-but
not to declare any winner by virtue of who publishes more. Rather, it
is to point out that many of the basic claims made about the Second
Amendment literature by individualist writers are simply and
demonstrably wrong. Contrary to individualist claims, an extensive
body of writing on the Second Amendment has been published well
before 1980, extending back more than seven decades; the
individualist view of the Second Amendment was never the dominant
view, unless one uses the arithmetic-based standard of whoever
publishes more is, ipso facto, dominant, in which case that
"dominance" only asserted itself in the 1990s; the Supreme Court has
committed no dereliction of duty for not accepting recent appeals
based on the Second Amendment, although the Court may well do so
at some point in the future and Supreme Court rulings do not
somehow expire or lapse into non-existence simply because they
predate the twentieth century.
As a visitor from another discipline, I have been most forcefully
struck by three interrelated observations arising from my research.
One is the ease with which some individualist writers have
misrepresented or ignored a considerable portion of the body of
writing on the Second Amendment within their own profession. The
proper and accurate summarization and assimilation of past literature
is such a bedrock of scholarly writing in this or any discipline that the
163. CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 68 (1959); see also id. at 69-71, 161, 175-76.
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failure of these writers to do so is little less than shocking. Second,
and related to the first observation, is the hugeness and vastness of
the law journal publishing realm. Surely no other academic discipline
cranks out such a prodigious volume of writing. This alone makes it
more likely that (even in a subfield as small as that of the Second
Amendment, relative to the total publication hole of law journals) an
ever-smaller percentage of its publications is actually read. The third
observation is the nearly unbelievable degree of repetition to be
found in that writing. As mentioned earlier, repetition of material is a
typical basis for manuscript rejection in most disciplines, on the
grounds that knowledge is not being advanced when it is merely being
repeated. Yes, some degree of repetition is necessary to recap and
synthesize arguments and facts previously published. For myself, I
simply found the degree of repetition, including numerous whole
articles that did nothing more than repeat the claims of others, to be
little less than mind-numbing, and little more than unnecessary.
Ultimately, the sheer mass of this writing is more likely to obfuscate
than clarify.
I offer these observations in conjunction with one other. Like
those trained in the legal profession, as a political scientist I share an
abiding love and respect for the law, and especially for constitutional
law, a connection underscored by the long and intimate relationship
between the fields of law and political science. It is no coincidence
that the foremost constitutional scholar of the first half of the
twentieth century, Edward S. Corwin, was in fact a political
scientist.164 Moreover, Corwin's intellectual stride spanned both legal
and academic worlds. As Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo
wrote to Corwin, "I find I have frequent occasion to draw upon your
learning. '1 65 The combination of the two is, or should be, a high
calling. In political science, one finds an increasing disdain for
research and writing that is designed, at least in part, to either reach a
wide public audience or seek to influence public policy. To its credit,
the legal community does not seem to labor under the same kind of
academic snobbery. On the other hand, the problems with the body
164. Corwin actually received his doctoral degree in history from the University of
Pennsylvania in 1905, but this came at a time when political science was not yet a fully formed
discipline. As a faculty member at Princeton, Corwin was a founding member of the Politics
Department, of which he was the first chair, and where he was later named the McCormick
Professor of Jurisprudence. Political science can thus rightly claim Corwin for itself. See
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: A DICTIONARY 51-52 (Glenn H. Utter & Charles Lockhart,
eds., 1993).
165. E. CORWIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION at ix (1976).
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of writing examined in this Article surely suggest that defective
analysis, and wayward public policy, may too easily arise from the
pages of law journals.
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